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This paper models commodity futures in a rational expectations equilibrium specifically 
(i) incorporating the conflict of interests between Hedgers (Producers-Consumers) and 
Speculators and (ii) superimposing constraints to immunize the real sector of the economy 
from shocks of excessive futures contracting.  We extend the framework of Newbery and 
Stiglitz (1981), Anderson and Danthine (1983) and Britto (1984) to attribute the conflicting 
and puzzling results in the empirical literature to the presence of multiple equilibria ranked in 
a pecking order of decreasing pareto-efficiency.  Thus, we caution empirical researchers on 
making inferences on data embedded with moving equilibria, as it can render their analysis of 
asset pricing mechanism incomprehensible.  Finally, we rationalize the imposition of position 
limits by policy makers to help steer the equilibria to pareto-inferior ones, which make the 
real sector of the economy more resilient to shocks from the financial sector. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Futures trading plays a vital role in society as it reallocates risk, reduces price volatility, 
offers liquidity, leads to price discovery, and enhances social welfare (see Turnovsky, 1983; 
Francis, 2000; and Goss, 2000).  However, futures pricing has intrigued both academics and 
managers since the seminal work of John Maynard Keynes on Normal Backwardation in 
1930.  Keynes postulated that the futures discount/premium over expected spot price 
compensates a speculator for bearing price risk of a commodity.1  The futures pricing 
mechanism is a function of hedgers' net position and their level of risk aversion.  When 
supply and demand of futures by equally risk averse hedgers offset each other, there is no 
need for a discount or premium.  Divergence of futures pricing from expected spot prices are 
contingent on the difference of risk aversion between short and long hedgers.  Speculators are 
traders who are prepared to bear risk, in return for which they expect to earn an appropriate 
risk premium.  As a result, speculators will buy [sell] futures contracts only if they expect 
                                                 
1  Keynes (1930) did not strictly distinguish between discount and premium, and referred to them both as 
Normal Backwardation.  However, contemporary literature distinguishes both, and classifies Normal 











prices to increase [decrease]. Hedgers, on the other hand, are prepared to pay a premium to 
lay off unwanted risk onto speculators. 
If hedgers, in aggregate, are short (or long hedgers are more risk averse than short 
hedgers), then speculators are net long, and in this case the futures will trade at a discount to 
expected spot price. This situation is referred to as Normal Backwardation.  In contrast, if 
hedgers are net long (or long hedgers are more risk averse than short hedgers), speculators 
will be net short, and futures will trade at a premium to expected spot price. This situation is 
known as Contango.  Thus, the futures discount/premium, according to Keynes (1930), serves 
as an insurance mechanism to transfer price risk to speculators.  However, empirical 
investigation of the Normal Backwardation theory of Keynes (1930) reveals conflicting 
results, as Houthakker (1957) finds support for it in the corn, cotton and wheat futures, while 
Rockwell (1967) contradicts it using a broader data set.2  Telser (1958) also contradicts the 
findings of Houthakker (1957), and Gray (1961) finds results consistent with those of Telser 
(1958). 
Modern finance rationalizes the pricing discrepancy between futures and spot prices 
using (i) Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)/ Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(C-CAPM) (Kolb, 1996; Breeden, 1980; and Jagannathan, 1985); or (ii) Hedging-Pressure 
Hypothesis (Hirshleifer, 1988); or (iii) General Equilibrium Theory (Anderson and Danthine, 
1983; Britto, 1984; Young and Boyle, 1989; and Francis, 2000).  However, the empirical 
investigation of these asset pricing theories is mired with conflicting results as: 
(i)  Dusak (1973) finds zero systematic risk and zero returns on corn, soybean and wheat 
futures, while Bodie and Rosansky (1980) and Fama and French (1987) find 
contradictory positive returns supporting Normal Backwardation; 
                                                 










(ii)  Carter, Rausser and Schmitz (1983) find supporting evidence for CAPM and Hedging 
Pressure Theories contradicting Dusak (1973).  However, Baxter, Conine and Tamarkin 
(1985) critique them relying on the suggestions of Marcus (1984) for the choice of 
market portfolio and find no risk premiums for corn, soybean and wheat futures.   
Ehrhardt, Jordan and Walking (1987) also find no risk premium on the above 
commodities using the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT); 
(iii)  Raynauld and Tessier (1984) evaluate risk-premiums in corn, oat and wheat, but deduce 
that they do not support Normal Backwardation as the premiums do not benefit hedgers 
or speculators.  Chang (1985) disagrees with the above study and finds that the 
speculator makes profits in commodities using non-parametric methods for determining 
risk premiums.  Hartzmark (1987) disagrees with Chang (1985) as he finds that futures 
trading is profitable to hedgers but not to speculators.  Thus, there are no risk-premiums 
to be earned, and he concludes against Normal Backwardation.  Park (1985) examines 
currency, metal and plywood futures, and finds support for Normal Backwardation for 
metals and not for the others; 
(iv)  Kolb (1992) studies 29 commodities and financial futures, and finds that only 7 of them 
support Normal Backwardation, while the remaining do not.  Bessembinder (1992) also 
finds that Normal Backwardation is not exhibited in financial and metal futures, but 
exists in agricultural and foreign currency futures.  Finally, Miffre (2000) analyzes 19 
commodities and financial futures incorporating time variations in futures risk 
premiums to conclude in favor of Normal Backwardation.3 
Thus, the above studies have arrived at inconsistent results in spite of testing data sets 
of different commodities (and financial futures) over different time periods and employing 
extremely sophisticated statistical techniques.  This discrepancy in results is also observed for 
some of the studies such as Dusak (1973), Carter, Rausser and Schmitz (1983), Chang (1985), 
                                                 
3  In a recent paper Miffre (2003) refines her empirical methodology (using both CAPM and APT) for 26 
commodity and financial futures to detect (i) Normal Backwardation for metal and financial futures and (ii) 










Baxter, Conine and Tamarkin (1985) and Ehrhardt, Jordan and Walking (1987), who have 
tested the same commodities (corn, soybeans and wheat) over roughly the same time period.  
This discrepancy between theoretical assertions and empirical behavior is a puzzle.4  The key 
issues of concern to academics, practitioners and policy-makers in this area are as follows: 
First: Is there something missing in the theory?  Second: Can we get such disparate results 
even when Normal Backwardation is the norm for commodities as demonstrated by Anderson 
and Danthine (1983) and Britto (1984)?  Third: Are there any policy implications to be 
derived from this investigation? 
The response to the first issue is in affirmative, as theoretical asset pricing models 
ignore the natural constraints inhibiting futures contracting by agents in the economy.  For 
instance, in a world where there are two hedgers (commodity producer and consumer) and a 
speculator, their freedom to contract futures is curtailed as follows: The commodity producer 
is restricted to shorting an amount of futures he/she is able to produce in the worst state of the 
economy.  The consumer is restricted by the aggregate demand-supply equilibrium condition 
in the spot market.  Finally, the speculator is restricted by the aggregate demand-supply 
condition in the futures market.  Ignoring these natural constraints can lead to erroneous 
results, and allow gyrations from the financial sector to permeate the real sector of the 
economy.  Our assertion on limiting futures contracting is corroborated by Rolfo (1980) and 
Lee (2003).5  It should be noted that apart from the natural constraints, policy makers impose 
additional constraints in the form of position limits, which are strictly enforced by futures 
exchanges such as the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(CME) etc. 
                                                 
4  Malliaris and Stein (1999) echo the same concern in their investigation of futures pricing from an efficiency 
perspective, which is interrelated with our methodology of rational expectations equilibrium described below 
(see also Sheffrin, 1996; and Bray, 1992). 
 
5  Rolfo (1980) is of the view that limited employment of the futures market is superior to a full short hedge 
under production variability.  This is also supported by Lee (2003), who explicates the intrinsic difference 
between hedging and speculating as follows: 
 
"In a textbook world, hedging means reducing a portfolio's net exposure to risk, and speculating 
means allowing a portfolio's exposure to risk.  With the former, expected returns are muted and, 









The main purpose of this paper is to respond to the two issues posed earlier.  That is, to 
rationalize the (i) puzzling behavior of futures prices in the empirical literature to the presence 
of multiple equilibria, ranked in the decreasing order of pareto-efficiency, (ii) imposition of 
additional constraints (by policy-makers) in the form of position limits to maneuver the 
multiple equilibria to pareto-inferior ones, which do not make the real sector of the economy 
vulnerable. 
We model commodity futures in a rational expectations equilibrium by (i) incorporating 
the conflict of interest between hedgers (such as producers-consumers) and speculators and 
(ii) superimposing natural futures contracting constraints to prevent shocks (of excessive 
futures contracting) from impacting on the real sector of the economy.6  We demonstrate how 
the end-user (consumer) of the commodity can strictly enforce that agents in the economy 
such as producers adhere to the futures contracting constraints.  Our model is an extension of 
the framework of Newbery and Stiglitz (1981), Anderson and Danthine (1983) and Britto 
(1984), where random shocks of production (or yield risks) emanating from the supply side 
impact on the equilibrium pricing of the commodity on the demand side leading to price risks.  
This has credence in the real world as agricultural commodities are subject to the fluctuations 
of weather on the supply side, giving rise to changes in prices on the demand side. 
Our approach using rational expectations equilibrium has a strong following in the 
academic and policy communities (see Sheffrin, 1996), while conflict of interest between 
competing economic agents is crucial for deriving their supply and demand side relationships 
and consequently their equilibrium parameters. 
This paper is organized as follows: The modeling of futures contract along with its 
solution is explicated in Sections II and III, while Section IV provides some concluding 
remarks. 
                                                 
6  Maddock and Carter (1982) define rational expectations as "the application of the principle of rational 
behavior to the acquisition and processing of information and to the formation of expectations."  Bray (1992) 
explicates it further by classifying rational expectations equilibrium as "self-fulfilling," as economic agents 










II.  MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
For simplicity and mathematical tractability, we assume a one-period economy with two 
goods and three types of agents.  There are nP identical Producers (P), nC identical Consumers 
(C) and nS identical Speculators (S) each endowed respectively with eP, eC and eS units of the 
Good 1, which is the numeraire good in our economy.  Good 2 is a perishable good produced 
solely for the Consumers by the Producers.7  The production process used for Good 2 is 
subject to random shocks (ξ
~
) stemming from exogenous forces such as weather.  The 
distribution of ξ
~
 is known to all agents.  Each producer converts x units of Good 1 into y ~ units 
of Good 2 using the production function g(x, ξ
~
), where y ~ = g(x, ξ
~
).  Furthermore, g(0, ξ
~
) = 0, 
δg
δx  = g1 > 0, 
δg





2  = g11 < 0.  The decision on the amount (x) of input to be 
used for the production of Good 2 is made in the beginning of the period, while the output of 
the production process (Good 2) is available at the end of the period.  Futures contracting is 
initiated at the beginning of the period, while its settlement takes place at the end.8  The 
demand for the perishable Good 2 is termed as D(p
~
, eC), where p
~
 is its stochastic price in the 
spot market, while eC is the income (endowment) of the consumer.  Since this demand stems 
only from the consumers, all that is produced is purchased for consumption at the end of the 
period.  Good 2 is defined by the sign of the covariance between the two risks emanating from 
the optimal production yield (y*
~
) and the spot price (p
~
) (see Hirshleifer, 1975).  If the sign of 
this covariance is positive [negative], Good 2 is construed as normal [inferior], otherwise it is 
considered to be an intermediate commodity (see Rolfo, 1980; Anderson and Danthine, 1983, 
                                                 
7   The assumption of perishability of Good 2 is not crucial to our analysis.  It is relaxed in Section III.b. to 
illustrate the invariance of the quality of our results. 
 
8   It should be noted that our one period model resembles that of a forward contract.  This is because 
differences between futures and forward prices for short-term contracts with settlement dates less than nine 
months tend to be very small. That is, the daily marking to market process appears to have little effect on the 
setting of futures and forward prices. Moreover, if the underlying asset's returns are not highly correlated 
with interest rate changes, then the marking to market effects are small even for longer-term futures. Only for 
longer-term futures contracts on interest-sensitive assets will the marking to market costs be significant. 
Because of this, it is a common practice in the literature to analyze futures contracts as if they were forwards. 










and Britto, 1984).  All agents are risk averse and maximize their respective concave and 
differentiable Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions denoted by UP(.), UC(.), US(.). 
 
II.a.  The Commodity Producer: 
The goal of each of the nP Producers is to optimally select the amount (x) of Good 1 to 
be used in the production process and the amount (qP) of Good 2 to be pre-sold in the futures 
market (at a unit price f) in order to maximize expected utility of consumption.  That is, 
  Max.  E0 { UP(cP
~)} 
 ( in cP, x, qP) 
subject to the budget constraint 
 c P
~  =  eP + [ p ~ (y ~ ) – x ] + qP (f – p ~) = (eP – x) + p ~ (g(x, ξ
~
) – qP)+ qP (f)  (1) 
where E0{.} is the expectation operator at time 0, cP
~ is the consumption of Producer at t = 1, 
while the remaining notations have the same meaning as stated earlier. 
The budget constraint at t = 1 (Equation 1) incorporates consumption of Good 1 
(stemming from residual of endowment net of input to production process (eP – x)) along with 
the proceeds of selling Good 2 (denominated in the numeraire Good 1) via: (i) Futures Market 
(involving qP units at a fixed price f) and (ii) Spot Market (involving residual units of output (y ~ 
– qP) at the prevailing stochastic price (p ~)). 
The objective function of each of the Producers can be rewritten as: 
  Max.  E0 {UP[(eP – x) + p ~ (g(x, ξ
~
) – qP)+ qP (f)]} 
 ( in x, qP) 
The First Order Necessary Conditions (FONCs or Euler Equations) are evaluated as 
follows: 
(i)  At the margin, Producers will use an optimal amount x* of Good 1, which yields net 
benefit at least equal to zero.  This results in the optimal yield (production level) y* ~  = 
g*(x*, ξ
~
) given as follows: 
E0 [(UP'(cP
















~)) E0(p ~ (g*1(x*, ξ
~
) ))+Cov0(UP'(cP





}  −  1  ≥  0 
⇒  E0(p ~ (y* ~ ))  +  
Cov0(UP'(cP
~), p ~ (y* ~ ))
E0(UP'(cP
~))
  ≥   1  (2)9 
If the Producers have adequate initial endowments (eP) then the above equation will 
hold as an equality. 
⇒  E0(p ~ (y* ~ ))  +  
Cov0(UP'(cP
~), p ~ (y* ~ ))
E0(UP'(cP
~))
  =   1  (2a) 
 
(ii)  At the margin, the Producers will sell forward qP units of Good 2, which yield net 
benefits at least equal to zero.  This yields optimal price of futures (f) given as follows: 
 

















   (3) 
  The above equation represents the supply side relationship of qP units of output pre-sold 
(at a price) f by the Producer, where the equality [strict inequality] sign is applicable 
when the natural constraint (described by Equation 10 in Section II.d. below) is non-
binding [binding]. 
Thus, maximization of each Producer's objective requires the following: 
(i)  The stochastic budget constraints (at t = 1), as depicted in Equation (1), be satisfied. 
(ii)  The simplified FONCs (Euler Equations), i.e., Equations (2a) and (3), be satisfied. 
(iii)  The second order conditions for a maximum are satisfied.10 
 
                                                 
9  The algebraic simplification of the above expression exploits the well known property of expectation of 
product of two random variables equals the product of their expectations in addition to the covariance 
between them (see Mood, Graybill and Boes, 1974). 
 
10 We do not attempt to verify these conditions, as it can be shown that maximizing a concave and 
differentiable objective function (such as a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function) with linear 










II.b. The  Consumer: 
The goal of each of the nC Consumers is to optimally select the amount of (qC) Good 2 
to pre-purchase in the futures market in order to maximize expected utility of consumption.  
That is,  
  Max.  E0{UC(cC
~
)} 
 ( in cC, qC) 
subject to the budget constraint 
 c C
~
  =  eC – (D(p
~
, eC))( p ~) + qC (p ~ – f)  =  eC – p ~ [D(p
~
, eC) − qC] − f (qC) (4) 
where cC
~
 is the consumption of Consumer at t = 1, while the remaining notations have the 
same meaning as stated earlier. 
The budget constraint at t = 1 (Equation 4) incorporates consumption utilizing 
endowment (eC) in the numeraire Good 1 to pay for Good 2 purchased via: (i) Futures Market 
(involving qC units at a fixed price of f) and (ii) Spot Market (involving residual demand units 
of [D(p
~
, eC) − qC] at the stochastic spot price (p ~)). 
The objective function of each of the Consumers can be rewritten as 
  Max.  E0{ UC[eC − (D(p
~
, eC))( p ~) + qC (p ~ − f)]} 
 ( in qC) 
The FONC (Euler Equation) is evaluated as follows: 
  At the margin, the Consumer will pre-purchase qC units of Good 2, which yield net 
benefits at least equal to zero.  This yields optimal price of futures (f) given as follows: 
 














   (5) 
The above equation represents the demand side relationship for qC units of output pre-
purchased at a price f by the Consumer, where the equality [strict inequality] sign is 
applicable when the natural constraint (described by Equation 9 in Section II.d. below) is non-
binding [binding]. 









(i)  The stochastic budget constraint in period t = 1 represented by Equation (4) be satisfied. 
(ii)  The simplified FONC, Euler Equation, i.e., Equation (5) be satisfied. 
 
II.c. The  Speculator: 
The goal of each of the nS Speculators is to optimally select the amount (qS) of Good 2 
to pre-purchase in the futures market in order to maximize expected utility of consumption.  
That is, 
  Max.  E0{ US(cS
~
)} 
 ( in cS, qS) 
subject to the budget constraint 
 c S
~
  =  eS + qS (p ~ – f)  (6) 
where cS
~
 is the consumption of Speculator at t = 1, while the remaining notations have the 
same meaning as stated earlier. 
The budget constraint at t = 1 (Equation 6) incorporates consumption utilizing 
endowment (eS) in the numeraire Good 1 along with net-payoffs in the Futures Market in 
Good 2 (involving qS units at the stochastic profit margin of (p ~ – f)). 
The objective function of each of the Speculators can be rewritten as: 
  Max.  E0{ US[eS + qS (p ~ – f)]} 
 ( in qS) 
The FONC (Euler Equation) is evaluated as follows: 
  At the margin, each of the Speculators will pre-purchase qS units of the commodity, 
which yield net benefits at least equal to zero.  This again yields optimal price of futures 
(f) given as follows: 
 















The above equation represents the demand side relationship for qS units of output pre-









applicable when the natural constraint (described by Equation 11 in Section II.d. below) is 
non-binding [binding]. 
Thus, maximization of the Speculator's objective requires: 
(i)  The stochastic budget constraint in period t = 1 represented by Equation (6) be satisfied. 
(ii)  The simplified FONC, Euler Equation, i.e., Equation (7) be satisfied. 
 
II.d. The  Natural Futures Contracting Constraints: 
 
(i)  For the real sector of the economy to be in equilibrium, the aggregate demand must 
equal the optimal aggregate supply: 
  ⇒  nC [D(p ~, eC)] = nP [g*(x*, ξ
~
)] = nP [y*
~
] 
 ⇒     D(p ~, eC)  =  
nP
nC
  [g*(x*, ξ
~






The above equation endogenously yields the stochastic pricing distribution of Good 2, 
i.e., (p ~) from the distribution of the random shock (ξ
~
).  This condition is equivalent to 
the information on the covariance between the stochastic variables, p ~ and y* ~ .  That is, 
on the classification of Good 2 as a Normal, Intermediate or Inferior commodity. 
 
(ii)  For the real sector of the economy to be immune from shocks of excessive financial 
contracting: 
  Consumers commit themselves to the minimum value of their exogenous demand 
function in the worst state of the economy, i.e., Min.[D(p
~
, eC)]  =  
nP
nC
 {Min.[y* ~ ]}, using 
Equation (8). 
  ⇒  
nP
nC
  {Min[y* ~ ]} ≥  qC  >  0  (9) 
 Likewise,  Producers  refrain from entering into futures obligations (qP) more than what 
they can deliver in the worst state of the economy, i.e., {Min.[ y* ~ ]}. 
  ⇒  {Min[y* ~ ]} ≥  qP  >  0.  (10) 
  Since Consumers ultimately bear the brunt of any cost overruns in the real sector of the 









the Producers by refusing to enter into any offsetting futures position if the upper bound 
of Equation (10) is violated.  This may seriously impact the demand for futures leading 
to a drop in its price (f) and impair the social welfare of errant Producers. 
 
(iii)  For the financial sector of the economy to be in equilibrium: 
  Futures contracts negotiated by the suppliers (Producers) must equal that demanded by 
Consumers and Speculators. 
  ⇒  nP qP = nC qC + nS qS (11) 
 
III.  MODEL SOLUTIONS 
A Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) is defined as one where all agents in the 
economy are knowledgeable of the following: 
(i)  Values of the random shocks (ξ
~
) of the production process and its probability 
distribution, as it is an exogenous parameter of the model, 
(ii)  Optimal input (x*) and yield of production process (y* ~ ), as it is endogenously 
determined in a unique solution using Equation (2a), 
(iii)  Demand function of Consumers for Good 2 [D(p
~
, eC)], as it is also an exogenous 
parameter of the model, and 
(iv) Spot  price  (p
~
) of Good 2 along with its probability distribution function, as it is 
endogenously determined in a unique solution using Equation (8). 
This framework explicates the futures pricing puzzle and sheds light on the role of policy-
makers as elaborated below. 
 
III.a. Key Result 
Theorem: 
The model solutions entail at most ten equilibria ranked in the pecking order of 
decreasing  pareto-efficiency.  These equilibria range from the most efficient and least 
probable one (where the natural futures contracting constraints are violated) to the remaining 









Keynes, 1930) is still the norm in all these equilibria for strictly Normal or Inferior 
commodities.  The above nine equilibria on the lower rung of pareto-efficiency resolve the 
futures pricing puzzle.  Imposition of more restrictive constraints of position limits (by policy-
makers) steers the equilibria to more manageable but pareto-inferior ones. 
Proof: 
The model solutions are ranked in the decreasing order of pareto-efficiency from the 
least restrictive equilibrium without any constraints to six with a single constraint and last 
three with two constraints.  The pareto-ranking of the equilibria stems from the fact that 
welfare of agents in an unconstrained optimization model is higher than that in a constrained 
one.  Therefore, as more constraints are added to the model, the equilibria obtained decreases 
in pareto-efficiency. 
 
The Highest Ranked (and Least Probable) Equilibrium 
This signifies an equilibrium, which makes the real sector of the economy most 
vulnerable to shocks from the financial sector.  This equilibrium is evaluated by initially 
assuming the absence of natural futures contracting constraints.  We superimpose the supply-
demand constraint (Equation 11) on the respective pricing functions of various agents derived 
in Sections II.a-c.  Since the equilibrium in this special case involves four  endogenous 
variables (f, qP, qC, qS), four independent Equations (3), (5), (7) and (11) are sufficient to 
yield a unique solution.  We thus consolidate Equations (3), (5) and (7) in the form described 
below: 
 



















   (12) 
Here the marginal utility of each agent adjusts in such a way that no agent is able to 
extract any economic surplus from the other.  Deviation of futures price from expected spot 
price is given in terms of a covariance term (of marginal utility of stochastic consumption 
with price risk) divided by expectation of marginal utility of consumption.  The stochastic 









described by Equations (1), (4) and (6) respectively.  However, the imposition of strict 
equality of futures pricing on all three agents (in Equation (12)) invalidates the above 
equilibrium in most cases, and leads to a violation of Equations (9) or/and (10). 
 
The Mid-Ranked Equilibria 
In general, if one natural constraint is strictly binding, then one Futures Pricing Equations 
(3), (5) or (7) becomes non-binding, i.e., holds strictly as an inequality in at most six equilibria.  
Here, the economic surplus is extricated by the agent whose futures pricing equation holds as a 
strict inequality.  Since this subcase involves three endogenous variables (f, qP or qC, qS), three 
independent Equations [two from (3), (5) or (7) and one from (11)] are sufficient to yield a 
unique solution. 
To elaborate the above point further: 
(i)  If the natural constraint on Producer is binding then qP =  {Min[y* ~ ]}. 
⇒  nP  {Min[y* ~ ]} = nC qC + nS qS (using Equation (11)) 
We thus solve for the endogenous variables (f, qC, qS) using the above conditions 
and the following equations. 
 
Equilibrium PC: 
Here, the futures pricing is determined by both Producers and Consumers, while 
the economic surplus is retained by the Speculator.  That is, 
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   (13a) 
 
Equilibrium PS: 
Here, the futures pricing is determined by both Producers and Speculators, while 
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    (13b) 
 
Equilibrium CS: 
Here, the futures pricing is determined by both Consumers and Speculators, 
while the economic surplus is retained by the Producer.  That is, 
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   (13c) 
 
(ii)  If the natural constraint on the Consumer is binding then qC = 
nP
nC
  {Min[y* ~ ]}. 
⇒  nP  qP = nP {Min[y* ~ ]} + nS qS (using Equation (11)) 
⇒  nP {qP – {Min[y* ~ ]}} = nS qS 
∵ qP is restrained by Equation (10), i.e., qP ≤ {Min[y* ~ ]} ⇒  qS ≤ 0. 
Here too, we derive at most three equilibria (PC', PS', CS') by solving for the 
endogenous variables (f, qP, qS) using the above conditions and the Equations 
similar to (13a-c). 
 
The Lower-Ranked Equilibria 
Finally, if the above mid-level equilibrium PC or PC' is infeasible, then we investigate 
the feasibility of the equilibria where the futures pricing function is determined by the 
Producer alone or the Consumer alone.  Likewise, if the mid-level equilibrium PS or PS' is 
infeasible, then we investigate the feasibility of the equilibria where the futures pricing 
function is determined by the Producer alone or the Speculator alone.  Similarly, if the mid-









where the futures pricing function is determined by the Consumer alone or the Speculator 
alone. 
Thus, if the natural constraints on both Producers and Consumers are binding, i.e., qP = 
 {Min[y* ~ ]} and qC = 
nP
nC
  {Min[y* ~ ]} ⇒ qS = 0 (Using Equation (11)).  We again derive at most 
three more equilibria by using the above conditions and the respective pricing functions of any 
one agent (while those of the remaining two hold as strict inequalities) as described below.  
Here too the economic surplus is extricated by the agents whose futures pricing conditions hold 
as strict inequalities. 
 
Equilibrium P: 





 ,  







  and 







   (14a) 
 
Equilibrium C: 





















  (14b) 
 
Equilibrium S: 





























   (14c) 
 
Thus, the presence of the middle and lower ranked nine equilibria in a dynamic setting 
has the capacity of rendering empirical analysis incomprehensible.  This rationalizes the futures 
pricing puzzle. 
Our general results hold true even when normal backwardation is the norm.  This is 
because the sign of the fraction on the right hand sides (of futures pricing conditions with 
covariance terms) in Equations (12), (13a-c), (14a-c) are negative [positive] for strictly normal 
[inferior] Good 2.  This is ascribed to the fact that futures contracting involve trade-off between 
risk and return.  When the covariance between yield and price risks is highly positive [negative] 
for strictly normal [inferior] Good 2, hedgers (Producers-Consumers) reduce [increase] risk by 
committing to a futures price at a discount [premium] to expected spot in accordance with the 
insurance perspective of futures, as articulated in Newbery and Stiglitz (1981), Anderson and 
Danthine (1983) and Britto (1984). 
Policy makers are apprehensive of spillovers from the financial sector of the economy 
into the real sector.  They impose position limits on the participants especially the speculators.  
Imposition of any additional constraint in our framework, say on speculators, is reflected on the 
other agents (hedgers) through the aggregate supply-demand relationship of financial futures 
(Equation 11).  This helps steer the equilibria from either the (i) mid-ranked ones (on the scale 
of pareto-efficiency) to lower-ranked ones or (ii) lower-ranked ones to still more restrictive, and 
thus more pareto-inferior ones. 
  Q.E.D. 
III.b. Extension of Model to Storable Commodities 
Our assumption of perishability of Good 2 (in Sections II and III.a.) helps make the 









addition of storage) by extending our model to a two period one (as described in Anderson 
and Danthine, 1983) to evaluate the futures pricing inequality for a Storage Operator (O) in a 
manner similar to the above sections.  This yields at most 14 equilibria of which 13 pareto-
inferior ones (PCS, PSO, CSO, PC, PS, PO, CS, CO, SO, P, C, S, O) rationalize the futures 
pricing puzzle.  Thus, the addition of storage does not affect the quality of our result despite 
its impact on the distribution of the spot price (Deaton and Laroque, 1992; and Chambers and 
Bailey, 1996). 
 
IV.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The pricing of futures has baffled both academics and managers for decades.  This issue 
has resulted in researchers questioning whether normal backwardation (in the context of 
Keynes, 1930) is really the norm for commodities.  This paper, however, takes a completely 
different stance on this vital issue of asset pricing.  We model the conflict of interest between 
economic agents superimposing futures contracting constraints to attribute the conflicting and 
puzzling results stemming from the empirical literature to the presence of multiple equilibria 
(ranked in a decreasing order of pareto-efficiency) even when normal backwardation holds 
true.  Thus, we caution empirical investigators on drawing inferences of time series data 
containing moving equilibria, as it can make analysis of the asset pricing mechanism 
incomprehensible. 
Our paper has profound implications for policy makers concerned about the economic 
stability.  They are advised to take into consideration restrictions of the pricing model in 
terms of position limits on the number of futures contracts to be traded.  Furthermore, policy-
makers need to be aware of the real-world complications and implementation details of a 
successful hedging strategy using commodity futures.  It is essential that they define limits to 
bets that can be taken in a clear and unambiguous way.  They should set up procedures for 
ensuring that limits are strictly followed. It is also particularly important that policy makers 
monitor risks very closely when derivatives are used.  This is because derivatives can be used 









derivatives trader responsible for hedging risk has switched to a speculator and exposed not 
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